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Summary 
The countries of southern Africa have not suffered senously from "financ.al contag.on wh.ch ,s the hort-
term and^sometimes devastating .mpact of financial crises in other countries. The first stage of financial 
' r c u r t e o u g h the markets for foreign exchange, shares and bonds. The second stage which can be 
e v e n m o r e ^ w a s t a f i n g , occurs if trouble in financial markets causes a crisis in the country's banking; systen, as 
hanDened in several A ian countries. South Africa's economy is potentially the most vulnerable n Southern 
Africa to financial contagion, bccause it has highly developed financial markets which are open to inflows and 
outflows of foreign capital. However, the economic cost of financial contagion has been limited in South 
Afr" a bee u s e T c o u n t r y ' s banking system is sound. Zimbabwe has been similarly protected from the worst 
t s contagion. Financial markets in the other countnes of Southern Africa are very 
underdeveloped, which limits the first stage of financial contagion; this is fortunate, because some o f h e m 
have unsound banking systems. All of these countries are actively trying to develop their financial sectors, 
howeve so that their r e k i v e immunity to financial contagion may be reduced in the future^ This will 
snengthen the case for maintaining macrocconomic balance, realistic exchange rates, and absolutely sound 
banking systems. 
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The impact on Southern Africa of the financial crises in Asia and Russia ' 
1. Introduction 
This paper analyses the reasons for the relative immunity of the SADC economies from the 
immediate and damaging effects of financial contagion. The paper examines the impact of the 
Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian crisis in 1998. 
There are several ways in which Southern African economies might be affected in the 
medium term by these crises, including their impact on the prices of primary commodities 
exported, reduced demand (particularly in Asia) for Southern African exports, increased 
competition in other export markets from Asian countries with shaiply devalued currencies, 
and the broader impact of reduced growth of the global economy. The focus of this paper, ' 
however, will be on "financial contagion", which is the immediate (although sometimes 
temporary) impact on financial markets in a countiy, from a financial crisis elsewhere. 
occurs 
' on 
rates 
Financial contagion can occur with frightening speed, and devastating effect. It 
through its impact on share prices through foreign sales of shares in equity markets, and 
bond prices through foreign sales of domestic bonds, and then immediately on exchange 
through the foreign exchange market as foreign investors convert sale proceeds into foreign 
exchange. It may also be possible for speculators to short-sell a currency, without prior 
investment, by borrowing from the domestic banking system to buy foreign currency; but this 
is only possible where bank liquidity is adequate, and bank regulations do not prevent it. 
There may be a second, and even more devastating stage, if the domestic banking system is 
affected by the initial effects in financial markets. This secondary effect can be more serious 
than the first, because of the high cost of rescuing insolvent banks, because of the lengthy and 
difficult process of restoring confidence in the banking system, and because the problems of 
Grateful thanks to my colleagues at BIDPA: Abdalla Gergis and Keith Jefferis for their perceptive comments 
on previous drafts, and Keba Lelatsang for extensive help with the statistics, some of which were verv difficult 
to obtain, and for developing the charts. 
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banks can spread to parts of the economy relatively unaffected by the initial impact on the 
exchange rate, and on share and bond prices. 
There are several reasons for the relative immunity of S ADC economies from financial 
contagion, but one of the most important reason, it will be argued, is that those SADC 
countries with developed financial markets have banking systems which are relatively sound 
and well regulated, having avoided the most serious mistakes made by banks in Asia and 
Russia. Meanwhile, those SADC countries with banking systems which have severe 
problems, their economies have escaped the worst effects of financial contagion because they 
have undeveloped financial markets, in which foreign investors have played very little part. 
Section 2 of this paper discusses briefly the causes of the crisis in Thailand in 1997, which is 
now referred to as the "Asian crisis", probably because it spread rapidly to other Asian 
economies, but not further afield. Section 3 examines the impact of the Thai and Russian 
crises on South Africa, because it is the dominant economy in SADC, and because it has by 
far the most developed financial markets through which financial contagion might occur. 
Section 4 examines the impact on Zimbabwe, as the next largest economy in SADC, and the 
country with the largest and most open financial markets after those of South Africa! Section 
5 then looks quite briefly at the impact on the rest of the SADC economies; it seems that they 
have proved relatively immune from financial contagion because of the underdeveloped state 
of their financial markets, the inability of foreign investors to withdraw from markets in 
which they had not invested in the first place, and their relative unimportance to global 
financial markets. A final section draws what conclusions appear to be possible for future 
policy. 
2. The apparent causes of the Asian crisis 
The Asian crisis began in Thailand in mid-1997, and spread immediately to those Asian 
countries which appeared to have similar problems (including especially Indonesia, Malaysia 
and the Philippines). At that stage, the crisis did not spread beyond the ASEAN region. 
Among the factors which explain the crisis in Thailand were that: 
- the currency had been pegged to the US dollar, and with higher inflation than in the United 
States, the real exchange rate had appreciated (this was made worse by the appreciation of the 
US dollar against other major currencies, especially the Japanese yen) 
- the pegged exchange rate encouraged domestic companies to borrow abroad at lower rates 
of interest than available from domestic lenders, without providing for the foreign exchange 
risk which was treated as if it did not exist 
- domestic banks had lent excessively to finance property development, and to other sectors 
using property as security; this made banks highly vulnerable to a fall in asset prices, which 
had also been driven up by the easy availability of bank credit, and by foreign investment in 
property (financed especially by Japanese banks) 
- domestic banks had also borrowed abroad at low interest rates, in order to finance loans 
denominated in domestic currency, without provisioning for the foreign exchange risk, 
because the currency peg was treated as if it had eliminated that risk 
- banks were also able to ignore the risks they were taking, because of an expectation of 
government rescue in a crisis (a clear case of moral hazard) 
- current account deficits had been financed by short term borrowing. 
A financial crisis in Thailand was not anticipated, even though with hindsight it may have 
been inevitable. Among reasons for not expecting a crisis were that the economy had high 
savings, high levels of foreign exchange reserves, and a budget surplus. Some 
"macroeconomic fundamentals" were therefore sound, but this was not enough to prevent a 
major financial crisis. The currency depreciated by more than 40% in the third quarter of 
1997. A large fall in property prices, combined with the currency depreciation, caused 
widespread insolvency of banks. In turn this meant that foreign lenders tried to recall their 
loans. The stock exchange was devastated, losing more than three quarters of its value in the 
second half of 1997; there was a partial recovery in 1998, but in March 1999 the index was 
only 28% of its value of the beginning of 1997 as shown in Table 1. 
Some indication of the tremendous fall in property prices in Thailand is that an auction of 
bank property loans in December 1998 fetched on average only 22% of their face value, and 
many were unsold. Office vacancies in Bangkok are currently 30%. In Jakarta, property 
values have fallen by two-thirds, and in Hong Kong by 60%. Even in Kuala Lumpur, 
whether government has provided considerable financial support, property prices have fallen 
by 20% [The Economist, 3 March 1999], 
Table 1 
Stock exchange prices in crisis Asian economies 
(end-1996 to 10 March 1999, US $ values) 
1 Jan - 1 Jan - 1 Jan -
31 Dec 31 Dec 10 Mar 
1997 1998 1999 
Thailand -75.9% +25.4 -8.9 
Malaysia -69.1% -1.0 -9.8 
Philippines -61.7% +7.3 +0.4 
Source: The Economist (various issuesj 
3. To what extent did the Asian and Russian crises affect South Africa? 2 
The largest economy in Southern Africa, by a large margin, is that of South Africa, which has 
approximately 70% of the collective SADC GDP. Zimbabwe has the second largest 
economy, at about 5% of SADC. The ability of South Africa to cope with crises in other 
parts of the world is therefore a major factor in the resilience of the other SADC economies. 
Most of them import heavily from South Africa. Primary commodity exports tend not to go 
to South Africa, but the neighbouring countries depend heavily on South Africa as a market 
for the manufactured exports necessary for economic growth and diversification. Some 
countries also benefit significantly from their migrant labour working in South Africa. South 
Africa's ability to resist financial contagion is therefore fundamental to the resistance of other 
Southern African countries. 
Because financial contagion operates through financial markets, the South African economy 
was and remains the regional economy most vulnerable to financial contagion. Because it 
has been possible for foreign investors to buy South African shares and bonds for some time, 
and this has happened on a large scale, it is also possible for large outflows to occur. In 
theory, it would also be possible for speculators to borrow from South African banks, in order 
to speculate against the rand; however, there has been for some time a continuous shortage of 
liquidity in the South African banking system, which the South African Reserve Bank meets 
by lending to the commercial banks. Any significant speculation against the rand by 
borrowing from the commercial banks could therefore be prevented by the South African 
Reserve Bank increasing the cost of its lending. 
(a) Impact of the Asian crisis on South Africa 
2 The elements of this section relating to what happened in the first three quarters of 1997 are very much 
indebted to "The South-East Asian crisis and implications for South Africa" [Centre for Research into Economic 
and Finance in Southern Africa, Quarterly Review, October 1997] 
It is very striking that South African share prices actually rose in local currency terms over 
the 18 months to mid-1998. Share prices rose, very slightly, in US dollar terms. This could 
have been offset by (or even been a result of) currency depreciation, but this did not happen. 
Nor were bond prices affected, as shown by the stability of interest rates. On the contrary, 
there was a net inflow of foreign capital. Table 2 and Chart 1 (e) illustrate these points. 
South Africa's exchange rate did depreciate in nominal terms, by a small amount, over the 18 
months, and by slightly more than the rate of inflation, but the differential was small.3 It was 
also remarkable that the net foreign asset position improved quite substantially, indicating a 
large net inflow of foreign capital, and that this was achieved without any increase in 
domestic interest rates. On the contrary, the Treasury Bill rate was a couple of percentage 
points lower at the end of the period than it was at the beginning; and longer-term interest 
rates, as shown by bond prices, were also unaffected as shown in Chart 5 (b). 
3 Strictly speaking, the comparison should be with the inflation differential, in this case between South Africa 
and the USA. American prices increased by 2.7% over the same period, which slightly increases the real 
depreciation of the Rand against the US dollar. 
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Table 2 
Some financial indicators for South Africa, end-1996 to mid-1998 
Dec 1996 June 1998 % change 
Share prices (a) 273 296 +8.4 
Rand/US$ 4.68 5.36 +14.5 
CPI index 189.7 207.7 + 9.4 
TB rate 16.1% 14.0% -13.0 
Net Foreign Assets (b) -31.0 -22.8 (+ 26.5) 
Notes: (a) Johannesburg Stock Exchange Index, Industry and Commerce (period average) 
(b) rand billions, end-period 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics; South African Reserve Bank Quarterly 
Bulletin 
Because the foreign exchange market, share prices, and bond prices were little affected by the 
Asian crisis, there was no significant danger of the second and more damaging stage of 
financial contagion, namely a crisis in the banking system. However, as will be argued below 
in discussing the reaction to the Russian crisis, the South African banking system should be 
effectively immune from financial contagion anyway. 
South Africa has also retained some exchange controls on capital account, but although the 
administration of exchange controls in South Africa is reckoned to be more efficient than in 
most countries, it is very well established that it is easier to find ways round exchange 
controls the longer they are in force. This raises questions about the effectiveness of South 
Africa's exchange controls, which have been in existence for a very long time; it is however 
in the nature of illegal activity that hard statistical information is almost impossible to obtain. 
(b) The Russian crisis of September 1998 
In contrast to the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian crisis of 1998 affected stock markets in the 
industrial countries, and on this occasion share prices in South Africa as well. The 
Johannesburg industrial index, having risen sharply earlier in 1998, fell by about 40% in 
September, showing only slight recovery in October. On the other hand, the exchange rate 
was largely unaffected; it fell sharply in June (from R5.2 to R5.9 the US dollar), but did not 
fall further in September when the Russian crisis occurred, instead recovering slightly to R5.8 
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in October. As in the previous crisis, the exchange rate was again largely unaffected. 
Depreciation of the rand was of the same order of magnitude as the inflation differential. 
However, on this second occasion the currency had to be defended by sharply higher interest 
rates, and there was a net outflow of capital suggesting that the South African Reserve Bank 
had also to be active in the foreign exchange market in defence of the currency. These 
changes are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Some financial indicators for South Africa, Jun-Oct 1998 
June 1998 Oct 1998 % change 
Share prices (a) 296 206 -30.4 
Rand/US$ 5.36 5.81 +8.4 
CPI index 207.7 220.6 +6.2 
TB rate 14.0% 20.1 +43.6 
Net Foreign Assets (b) -22.8 -28.9 (-26.7) 
Notes: as for Table 2 
Why did the Russian crisis have such a major effect on share prices, compared with the 
impact of the Asian crisis? It may be that the Russian crisis was simply one crisis too many; 
or it may be that the reaction was overdone, and will be quickly reversed.4 Meanwhile, 
financial contagion so far has only spread to share prices. There has been no second stage of 
financial contagion, with the South African banks largely unaffected by the crisis, and 
certainly not rendered insolvent. Some of the reasons for this are 
- the major South African banks are long-established and well regulated, with failures and 
insolvencies limited to relatively small financial institutions 
- banks have not lent excessively to the property sector (nor indeed to any other one sector) 
- banks in South Africa do not invest in equity or use borrowers' shares extensively as loan 
security 
- banks in South Africa have not borrowed extensively abroad, in order to make loans 
denominated in domestic currency (as it happens, this would not have created losses during 
the period being discussed, because of the relative stability of the exchange rate). 
4 It was not quickly reversed; the share index in Table 3 was still at 200 in January 1999. There was a partial 
recovery thereafter, but only by 19% by mid-April. 
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4. To what extent did Zimbabwe suffer from financial contagion? 
(a) Impact of the Asian crisis on Zimbabwe 
In the first place, Zimbabwe was fortunate because of the ease with which South Africa 
resisted financial contagion. South Africa is by some margin Zimbabwe's largest trading 
partner, accounting for 12% of exports and 36% of imports. South Africa is probably also a 
major source of finance for Zimbabwe, but statistics on this are not readily available. On the 
other hand, the openness of Zimbabwe's financial markets to flows of foreign capital meant 
that the country was more vulnerable to financial contagion than the other countries in the 
region (except South Africa of course). Indeed, foreign investors fuelled an extended rise in 
the stock exchange in 1996 and the first half of 1997; the industrial index reached an all-time 
high of just over 12,000 in early August 1997. Yet the stock exchange "had survived the 
brunt of the Asian crisis nearly unscathed, only to succumb in November to a massive 
collapse in confidence in the Zimbabwe dollar, reducing one of Africa's most buoyant stock 
exchanges to shambles" [EIU Country Report, 1st quarter 1998: 23]. 
The collapse in confidence in the Zimbabwe dollar did not occur until November 1997. The 
currency was overvalued, but this did not result in it falling in July at the time of the crisis in 
Thailand. Its eventual collapse was caused by domestic factors, including the government 
giving in to the demands of war veterans (and the implications of this for the government's 
budget), renewed statements that white farmers would be expropriated, and a worsening trade 
position. Thus although foreign investors played a part in the dramatic fall of financial 
markets, the evidence seems to be that their reassessment of Zimbabwe not caused by the 
Asian crisis. 
The indicators in Table 4 show some of these factors, although not the exact timing described 
above. The table also shows that the net foreign asset position deteriorated on a massive 
scale, and that this occurred despite nominal interest rates being pushed up by more than half. 
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Table 4 
Some financial indicators for Zimbabwe, end-1996 to mid-1998 
4th quarter 1996 2nd quarter 1998 per cent change 
Share prices (a) 12000 (July 97) 7600 - 53.3% 
z$/us$ 10.7 17.4 + 62.5% 
CPI index 424.4 631.2 + 49.1% 
TB rate 19.3% 31.1% + 61.1% 
Net Foreign Assets (b) -3.1 -17.2 (May) (- 454.8%) 
Notes: (a) Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Industrial Index 
(b) Zimbabwe dollar billions, end-period 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics-, Economist Intelligence Unit Zimbabwe 
Country Report 
In addition to the facts already mentioned, much of Zimbabwe's financial turbulence can be 
attributed to the government's inability to reach agreement with the IMF. There were 
repeated postponements during 1997 and 1998 of agreement on a new 12-month stand-by 
loan. Somewhat against expectations, agreement was reached in June 1998, for a loan of US 
$175 million, but the government's undertakings lacked credibility: 
"The macroeconomic performance targets set by the IMF for 1998 would 
require an improvement of all economic indicators over their 1997 levels, 
but as the economic situation has not improved this is widely believed to 
be unachievable" [EIU Zimbabwe: Country Report, 3rd quarter 1998: 
17]. 
Furthermore, almost immediately after the deal was signed and money released, the 
government imposed price controls on maize meal, threatened price controls on other basic 
foodstuffs, and raised civil service wages. Paying for this meant that the government was 
very unlikely to achieve targets agreed for the budget deficit (to reduce it from 8.3% of GDP 
in 1997 to 5.5% in 1998, with steady further reductions to 2.9% in 2001). Inability, or 
unwillingness, to reduce the budget deficit was the fundamental reason for having to go to the 
IMF originally in 1991, and has been the major reason for the lack of success of IMF 
programmes since then. 
It might have been worse. There had not been a boom in asset prices (apart from shares), so 
that a collapse was less likely. The openness of the stock exchange to foreign inflows and 
therefore to foreign outflows, provides much of the explanation for large fluctuations in share 
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prices, but this was not repeated for other domestic assets. As a result, there was no second 
stage of financial contagion in the form of a domestic banking crisis. Most of the main 
financial institutions in Zimbabwe are, like those in South Africa, long-established, well 
managed, and adequately regulated by the longest established central bank in Sub-Saharan 
Africa apart from the South African Reserve Bank. The banks in Zimbabwe have not 
invested in property, and do not include shares in their asset portfolios. The government-
owned commercial bank has had some problems, but so far these have not led to insolvency 
[Harvey, 1998: 166-70]. Moreover, a systemic crisis is unlikely because Zimbank does not 
dominate the sector as do the government-owned commercial banks in Ghana, Tanzania and 
Uganda, for example, where governments decided to rescue their commercial banks, at 
enormous cost [Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998: Chapters 4, 6, 7, 10]. 
The economy also avoided, until recently, the problems that might have arisen from licencing 
locally-owned commercial banks. These emerged elsewhere in Africa, often in large 
numbers. Many of them failed [Brownbridge and Harvey, 1998; Brownbridge, 1998a]. 
Although these new, small commercial banks have many potential advantages, it was 
generally costly if they were allowed to be licensed before the reform of banking legislation 
and banking supervision; Zimbabwe avoided this error. 
There were other reasons why the crisis in Zimbabwe was limited. Zimbabwe did not have 
some of the characteristics which contributed to financial crises elsewhere: 
- the exchange rate was not pegged to another currency, still less an appreciating currency, but 
was floated from 1991, which limited (although it did not completely prevent) overvaluation 
- because the exchange rate floated, domestic borrowers were less likely to borrow abroad 
even though the domestic cost of borrowing was very high in nominal terms (above 30% 
from 1993) 
- the current account deficit was not excessively financed by foreign short-term borrowing. 
(b) Impact of the Russian crisis on Zimbabwe 
At first glance, the Russian financial crisis of late 1998 might appear to have had a very direct 
effect on the Zimbabwe dollar. However, a close inspection of Chart 2 (h) shows that the 
sharp fall of the Zimbabwe dollar began at least a month before the Russian crisis started, and 
that the worst of the depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar was over when the Russian 
depreciation was still in full flow. Overall, the doubling of the cost of foreign exchange in 
Zimbabwe in late 1998 seems to have had little to do with financial contagion. It was largely 
a product of domestic economic circumstances, including the government's participation in 
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the war in the DRC. The decline of the currency occurred despite the government pushing 
interest rates up higher than ever before, stringent foreign exchange controls being bought 
back in September and made even more stringent in December, and the forced sale to the 
central bank of domestic foreign currency accounts. 
The Zimbabwe stock exchange also continued to decline, as did the net foreign assets 
position (Table 5). By October 1998, the share price index was less than half its all-time peak 
in July 1997. However, it did recover (to 7000, from its low of 5800) by the end of the year. 
Basically, the Zimbabwe stock exchange has been extremely volatile for some time, and 
although a great deal of this can be attributed to inflow is an outflow is from foreign portfolio 
investors, the fluctuations do not seem to be particularly associated with the Russian financial 
crisis. For example, the Zimbabwe stockmarket actually rose for a few months during the 
most dramatic collapse in Russian share prices, see Chart 4 (h). 
Table 5 
Some financial indicators for Zimbabwe, July to October 1998 
2nd quarter 1998 October 1998 per cent change 
Share prices (a) 7600 5800 -23.7% (c) 
Z$/US$ 17.4 35.8 +99.1% 
CPI index 631.2 663.5 +5.9% (d) 
TB rate 30.7% 34.8% +12.0% 
Net Foreign Assets (b) -17.2 (May) -31.7 (-89.8%) 
Notes: (a) Zimbabwe Stock Exchange Industrial Index 
(b) Zimbabwe dollar billions, end-period 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics; Economist Intelligence Unit Zimbabwe 
Country Report 
(c) Note that the index recovered to above 7000 by end-January 1999. 
(d) by the end of 1998, inflation was running at an annual rate of about 45%. 
5. To what extent did the Asian crisis affect other countries in Southern Africa? 
The other, smaller economies in Southern Africa were less vulnerable to contagion from the 
Asian and Russian economic and financial crises than Zimbabwe and South Africa (provided 
always that South Africa itself remained stable, because of the considerable regional 
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dependence on its largest economy). Zimbabwe and South Africa are the only countries in 
the region to have significant stock exchanges and bond markets in which foreign investors 
might be interested. 
Without such financial markets, there are only very limited ways in which financial contagion 
could occur. Foreign withdrawal from financial markets is a major mechanism for causing an 
exchange rate crisis; without prior foreign investment in such markets, there is little or no 
scope for foreign attacks on currency in the absence of markets for derivatives. 
Investors in fixed assets, for example manufacturing plant or commercial property, do not 
invest in the expectation of being able to exercise a quick reversal of their investment. 
Markets for such assets are not at all liquid, so that even if investors were to change their 
assessment of an economy, there would be no mechanism by which they could suddenly 
withdraw. Indeed, they would in most cases be foolish to try. Even if they could sell a fixed 
asset and acquire local currency, the market in foreign exchange (where such a market exists) 
is generally too small and too shallow to accommodate the conversion of large amounts of 
domestic currency into foreign exchange (Botswana is, as in so many things, an exception, 
because of having exceptionally large foreign exchange reserves). At best, assuming that 
repatriation of investment capital would be allowed, an investor would only be able to 
convert the proceeds of the sale into foreign exchange over an extended period of time; this 
rules out what is normally described as financial contagion. 
The relative absence, or extremely small size, of financial markets in SADC is beginning to 
change. A number of countries have created stock exchanges in the last few years. However, 
in all cases (except Mauritius) they are at present extremely small. The number of companies 
quoted ranged in 1997 from two in Tanzania, to 13 in Namibia (and 40 in Mauritius). The 
following table shows the stock exchanges covered in the publications of the International 
Finance Corporation [1998], This excludes two of the SADC markets which have recently 
started stock exchanges (Mozambique and Tanzania), but they have a minimal number of 
quoted shares. To put these markets in global perspective, statistics for the United States and 
Germany are also given. 
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Table 6 
SADC stock exchanges: number of companies quoted and market capitalisation, 1997 
Number of 
companies quoted 
Market capitalis-
ation (US$ mn) 
Annual turnover 
% range (1994-7) 
Botswana 12 615 9.0-12 3 
Mauritius 40 1665 4.6-8.2 
Namibia 13 689 4.0-16.2 
Swaziland 4 129 0.1-122.7 (a) 
Zambia 6 705 1.8-2.5 (b) 
Zimbabwe 64 1969 7.6-17.1 
South Africa 642 232,069 6.5-18.3 
Germany 700 825,233 124.7 (c) 
United States 8851 11,308,779 | 90.3 (c) 
Note: (a) annual turnover on the Swaziland stock exchange was less than 1% in each of the 
years 1994 to 1996. The number of quoted stocks fell from 6 to 4 in 1997, suggesting there 
may have been a takeover in 1997, which would account for the very high turnover ratio 
(b) 1996 and 1997 only. 
(c) 1997 only. 
Source: International Finance Corporation Emerging Stock Markets Factbook 1998 
The Botswana and Namibia stock exchanges also have dual listings, of South African 
companies with local activities. From the companies' point of view, this is presumably done 
largely for public relations purposes. From the point of view of local investors, it makes the 
purchase of shares in a small number of large South African companies more convenient, and 
where exchange controls still exist (they were abolished in Botswana in 1999) it provides 
additional opportunities to buy foreign shares. As with local shares, however, turnover tends 
to be extremely low. On the Botswana stock exchange, for example, in a typical week there 
are several local shares in which there are no transactions; activity in the foreign companies is 
even less, with no turnover at all in some weeks in any of the dual listed shares. Moreover, 
transactions in the dual listed shares on these peripheral stock exchanges have virtually no net 
impact on foreign exchange markets. 
In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the smaller SADC stock exchanges have 
been largely immune from financial contagion. The markets are also shallow, so that any 
foreign investment must be undertaken by investors with a relatively long-term view. They 
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must know from the beginning that market depth and liquidity is quite inadequate for any 
rapid getaway following a change of sentiment. It can take several days, or even weeks, to 
buy shares in the first place, and just as long to sell; the basic components of liquidity (sale at 
short notice, and in a market so deep that the prices not affected) are almost totally absent. 
Other countries in the region also have very small stock exchanges and bond markets, or none 
at all. This means that private international capital flows cannot easily have a short-term 
impact on these economies. In turn, this protects them from the crises of confidence, and 
banking insolvency, that can result from internationally-induced asset price changes. 
It is theoretically possible for a speculative attack to be launched from abroad on these minor 
regional currencies. A foreign speculator could borrow from domestic banks, and use the 
domestic currency to buy foreign exchange. This of course assumes that domestic banks are 
currently allowed to lend to non-resident borrowers, and that there is a liberalised market in 
foreign exchange. However, the scope of such an attack can be limited by banking regulation 
of the lending of domestic currency to non-resident borrowers. For example, in Botswana the 
commercial banks (which dominate the monetary system as in most African countries) may 
not lend more than four times their unimpaired capital to all non-resident borrowers 
combined. This sets an upper limit of P2 billion, or about the equivalent of three months 
imports of goods and services, and about 8% of the foreign exchange reserves. Countries 
with lower levels of foreign exchange reserves than Botswana could of course set a lower 
limit on such lending by commercial banks. 
If this analysis is correct, any apparent correlation between the Asian and Russian crises on 
the one hand, and movements in financial markets in the smaller SADC countries on the 
other hand, is almost certainly spurious. In fact, inspection of the graphs in Charts 1 to 4 
show occasional short periods where events in the foreign currency and share markets of 
Thailand and Russia appear to be moving in the same direction as some of the currencies and 
shares of the small SADC countries, but in each case there have also been periods where they 
moved in exactly opposite directions. Even where, as in the example of Malawi's currency 
and the Russian effect, the two occurrences moved in the same direction, it would be hard to 
argue for the one causing the other. Malawi's currency began to depreciate long before the 
Russian crisis, and even the acceleration of that depreciation correlates poorly with 
movements in the Russian currency. 
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It is just as well that financial markets are so undeveloped that the first stage of financial 
contagion is unlikely to occur in the smaller members of SADC, because some regional 
banking systems are fragile, notably in Tanzania and Zambia. The government-owned banks 
in Tanzania, which comprised the entire banking system, had bad debts of more than 80% of 
their loan portfolios in the mid-1990s. The cost of writing off these bad debts and 
recapitalisation was estimated at more than 10% of GDP, and with a strong possibility that 
the problem and its costs would be repeated within a few years. The scale of the problem in 
Zambia was less, simply because the government-owned commercial bank (ZANACO) has 
not had more than about 25-30% of the commercial bank market, and it was relatively well 
managed "with bad debts believed to be a small share of total loans" [Harvey, 1993], While 
this situation has probably deteriorated since that was written, the cost of writing off bad 
debts must be smaller than in Tanzania because ZANACO's total loan portfolio is less than 
3% of GDP. 
The situation of banking systems in Angola and Congo is dominated by war. Until quite 
recently, something similar applied to Mozambique. Moreover, central and commercial 
banking were combined in the Bank of Mozambique until 1992, and a review of the 30 
largest borrowers showed that 99% of loans were non-performing [Harvey, 1996: 142-8], It 
may be too soon to know whether subsequent reform has been effective. Malawi had serious 
problems in the early 1980s, but was unusual in moving to deal with them quickly, and 
successfully [Brownbridge, 1998b: 193-4]. Banking systems in the other Southern African 
countries are relatively sound. All the regional economies could lose direct foreign 
investment, if the Asian and Russian crises make potential investors regard all developing 
countries as more risky. There is already some evidence of a fall in the flow of foreign direct 
investment into developing countries; but bad, although serious, is not what is meant by 
financial contagion. 
This relative immunity from financial contagion is not anything to be proud of, because it 
arises from the insignificance of the smaller regional economies, and their lack of financial 
development. However, all the smaller SADC members, except from those involved in 
major wars, are actively trying to develop their financial sectors. The objective of every new 
stock exchange is to increase the number of quoted companies, to widen the range of 
investors, and to develop greater depth and liquidity in order to make higher turnover ratios 
possible. These are legitimate objectives, because financial markets cannot perform their roll 
in increasing allocative efficiency if the financial markets themselves are inefficient. It is also 
part of overall economic policy to develop sufficient economic strength that financial markets 
can be liberalised, allowing free entry and exit to foreign participants. The irony is that the 
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greater the success in achieving these objectives, the more vulnerable will these economies 
become to financial contagion. Just as the larger global economies are beginning to worry 
about the consequences of financial globalisation, those few countries which are immune 
from financial contagion are actively pursuing policies which will remove that immunity. To 
the extent that they succeed, there will be increasing pressure on them to maintain 
macroeconomic balance, and absolutely sound banking systems, because of the risk of 
speculative attacks on their financial markets if their fundamentals make them seem probable. 
6. Conclusions 
It would be presumptuous to try and conclude very much from this brief paper. To the extent 
that any conclusions are possible, it would seem that Southern Africa has escaped much of 
the "contagion" experienced elsewhere. The most vulnerable country is South Africa, 
because of the very much greater development of the South African financial markets, and 
their increasing exposure to international capital flows. The contagion has been limited in 
South Africa, however, because the economy has avoided many of the worst characteristics 
which contributed to crises elsewhere; unsound banking, asset price booms, excessive short 
term foreign borrowing, and foreign borrowing based on expectations of a fixed dollar 
exchange rate (the South African Reserve Bank did encourage private sector foreign 
borrowing by providing subsidised forward cover, but the very large cost was born by the 
government and did not therefore endanger the borrowers or their banks). The stability of 
South Africa is basic to the smaller economies in the region, so that this relative immunity (if 
sustained) protects them from financial contagion. 
The paper also suggests some very simple lessons for Southern African countries, namely to 
avoid the mistakes listed in Section 2. Most of these mistakes should be avoided anyway, 
regardless of the dangers of financial contagion. Macroeconomic balance is a fundamental 
prerequisite for sustainable growth and development. And there is strong evidence that sound 
banking and financial sector development assist economic growth; the case for this is 
strengthened at the margin by the argument that sound financial institutions are one of the 
ways of preventing the second and more costly stage of financial contagion. 
More generally, the governments of major industrial countries, and the international financial 
institutions that they dominate, appear from the recent IMF/World Bank meetings, and the 
financial press, to have realised at last that complete freedom of international capital flows 
can be far from optimal, and indeed highly dangerous to global economic welfare. 
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Unfortunately, there is no concensus, either among economists or among governments, as to 
how to tame this tiger (or, to change the metaphor, how to get all the unwanted effects back 
into Pandora's box). 
BIDPA, Gaborone, March 1999 
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